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In their introduction, the editors of this book, Catharine Abell and Katerina
Bantinaki, give an excellent account of the present state of play in the philosophy
of pictures. Depiction, the mode of representation distinctive of pictures, has seen a
growth in philosophical interest over the past few years, and Abell and Bantinaki
think the field holds even more potential: ‘While the philosophy of language has long
been considered a philosophical discipline in its own right, the philosophy of depiction
is usually thought of, when it is thought of at all, as a sub-discipline of aesthetics. This
is like conflating the philosophy of language with the philosophy of literature’ (1).
That the study of depiction may grow to occupy a position comparable to philosophy
of language might seem doubtful to us now, but Abell and Bantinaki are right to draw
attention to the fact that the place of depiction within aesthetics is an historical hap-
penstance. As the papers collected in this volume illustrate, there is usually only inci-
dental concern with the aesthetic and artistic in the literature on depiction. The big
issue addressed by that literature in the past is symptomatic of this unconcern with art
and aesthetics: it has centred on finding a definition of depiction, one that applies
equally to snapshots and Signorellis. This collection largely avoids the problem of
definition to focus on issues that are only now beginning to attract substantial atten-
tion. It is telling of the state of the field just how much one such issue, the experience
of pictures, dominates: it is the central topic of five of the book’s eight chapters. But let
me say something about the other three chapters first.
The first of these, by John Kulvicki, investigates the commonplace that there are
many different ways – styles and systems – of picturing. Kulvicki argues that the
situation is, in some ways, simpler than this suggests: there are many different ways
of producing a picture, but rather fewer ways of interpreting it. The key is to recognize
that it is not the multitude of different styles and systems of picturing that are signifi-
cant for interpretation, so much as the representationally salient properties they in-
stantiate – and these present much less diversity. Kulvicki goes on to argue, with some
justification to my mind, that the constraints on interpretation are explained by the
fact that pictures resemble what they depict, a central plank of his own (2006) theory
of depiction.
Abell includes a paper of her own, investigating the epistemic value of photographs.
Photographs are generally superior to hand-made pictures as sources of knowledge
about what they depict. Abell argues, in the face of opposing views, that this fact has
its roots in the reliability of the standardized, mechanical processes of photography.
Abell’s position has the appeal of common sense, and it does seem to me that this is
one instance where common sense has it pretty much right. Dominic Lopes’s chapter
begins with a less commonsensical proposal. Looking at a picture of X, it often seems
natural to say ‘That’s X’, rather than ‘That’s a picture of X’ – something we would
never do in the presence of a description of X. Lopes holds that this ‘image-based
demonstrative’ – ‘That’s X’ – is literally, and not just figuratively, true. He argues that
this is so because pictures perceptually ground such reference through deixis, an
aspect of visual experience usually associated with actually being in the presence of
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the object. This bold proposal leads on to a re-evaluation of Mohan Matthen’s (2005)
work on pictures and deixis, in a fascinating and original discussion deeply informed
by cognitive science.
Moving on to those chapters that focus on the experience of pictures, John H.
Brown argues that the literature on depiction has not paid enough attention to
what are usually considered ‘unauthorized’ experiences of pictures. In the case of a
sketch, for instance, this could be an experience of the subject as being constituted of
(rather than merely depicted by) cross-hatched marks. Brown’s superb exploration of
a wide range of such perceptions enriches our understanding of a neglected dimension
of pictorial experience, but his claims that these should be considered part of the
authorized interpretation of pictures will be more contentious.
Richard Wollheim (1987) called seeing-in – an experience that seems to character-
ize much picture perception – ‘twofold’, since it involves having a visual awareness of
the three-dimensional depicted subject and simultaneously being aware of the flat
picture surface that depicts it. Two chapters propose to explain twofoldness. John
Dilworth holds that twofoldness is not so strange as it might at first seem, since
ordinary perception has, on his analysis, a comparable structure. This is an appealing
idea, but whether Dilworth’s ‘double content’ account of perception gives the right
approach will be a matter of dispute. One disputant will be Bantinaki, whose chapter
gives an alternative account of twofoldness. Drawing on Aristotle’s doctrine of the
unity of matter and form, she argues that the ordinary visual perception of matter and
form as united in objects is akin to the twofold experience of (say) paint and the
subject matter it depicts. To my mind, Bantinaki’s lucid account seems better to
illuminate not Wollheimian seeing-in, but the kind of pictorial experience Robert
Hopkins draws attention to in his paper: inflected pictorial experience, which, as
Hopkins argues, may not be twofold at all. Inflection occurs when, in viewing a
picture, we experience its subject matter as having ‘inflected properties’, that is,
properties ‘a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface’s
design (conceived as such)’ (158). For instance, this might involve seeing the subject
of a heavily impasted Rembrandt as having some of the textural properties of the
paint. Inflection was first discussed by Michael Podro (1998) and has more recently
received attention from Lopes (2005); but it is this excellent paper of Hopkins that
seems most likely to bring it to the forefront of attention of writers on depiction. This
is not least because Hopkins casts substantial doubt on whether inflected pictorial
experience is twofold (and therefore whether it is a species of seeing-in). Nanay’s
chapter takes up Hopkins’s challenge, arguing that Hopkins is wrong to doubt that
inflected pictorial experience is twofold. But the greater part of his chapter develops
the work of Podro and Lopes in a different way, arguing that the differences between
inflected and non-inflected pictorial experience can be understood using a bold ac-
count of seeing-in (Nanay 1998) that, like Lopes’s essay, draws on ideas from
Matthen’s (2005) work.
This collection gives an excellent picture of work at the forefront of a vibrant area
of analytic philosophy. It also plays an important role in developing existing debates,
especially around pictorial experience, and as such is essential reading for anyone with
a serious interest in the philosophy of pictures. The cover design, featuring Roy
Lichtenstein’s Magnifying Glass (1963), also marks this out as the best-looking
book on depiction – a not inconsequential virtue, at least so long as depiction remains
a sub-discipline of aesthetics.
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The Errors of Atheism
By J. ANGELO CORLETT
Continuum 2010. xxiiþ 248 pp. £100.00 cloth, £29.95 paper
The Errors of Atheism does deal with what Corlett suggests are the errors of atheism.
It also deals with the ‘uninformed, dismissive, and bellicose dogmatism [of] many
orthodox theists (14)’, for Corlett holds that ‘the orthodox Christian notion of God
falls prey to the standard objections raised by various philosophers’ (90). However,
it is atheists that Corlett is most insistent on castigating. Their main mistake is quite
simple: they do not discuss Corlett’s favoured deity. This is also an error that trad-
itional theologians make, but taking account of that in the title would, perhaps, not
have the effect Corlett wants.
The Errors of Atheism is in two parts: ‘The Errors of Atheism’ (‘Analyzing
Atheism’, ‘The Errors of Atheism’, ‘Dawkins’ Godless Delusion’, ‘The New
Agnosticism’) and ‘Grounding God’ (‘Naturalizing Theism’, ‘Liberating Theism’, ‘Is
Hybrid Minimalist Theism Plausible?’)
Corlett wants to blend some ‘of the basic features of process and liberationist
theisms’ (4). He remarks, confidently, ‘One benefit of my analysis of the existence
of God is that, unlike most philosophical accounts, mine is better informed theologic-
ally. And unlike most theological accounts, mine is well-informed philosophically’
(91).
The views of ‘some of [atheism’s] most philosophically sophisticated proponents’
contain ‘fundamental logical and conceptual flaws’ (14). The three major atheists
Corlett considers are Antony Flew, John Mackie and Kai Nielsen (‘the most notable
living atheist philosopher’ (41)). Recent and important works in the area, such as
Graham Oppy’s Arguing About Gods, or John Schellenberg’s trilogy, Prolegomena to
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